Abstract. We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the existence of MPEs and show that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. A method for constructing pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient.
Introduction
Many markets involve buyers and sellers of relationship specific products and services. The particularities of these relationships may derive from location, technological compatibility, joint business opportunities, free trade agreements, social contacts, etc. Such markets are naturally modeled as networks and the structure of the network determines the nature of economic interaction between the agents who form the nodes of the network.
For example, imagine a group of employers who have needs for different tasks and a group of workers with distinct sets of skills. The links between workers and employers depend on how skills translate into the necessary tasks and other factors such as physical location and social relationships (Granovetter 1973) . In another application, a group of suppliers (for instance, laptop component manufacturers) offer exclusive commitments to a group of upstream producers. Another is the case of licensing arrangements being negotiated between basic technology providers (different platforms for developing computer software or smart Date: September 13, 2011. We thank Drew Fudenberg for extensive discussions and Fuhito Kojima and Al Roth for helpful comments. We also thank the editor and referees for useful suggestions.
phone applications, for example) and final product designers. Compatibility issues limit the connections between these groups and lead to non-trivial, incomplete networks.
The setting is as follows. We consider a network where each pair of players connected by a link can jointly produce a unit surplus. The network generates the following infinite horizon discrete time bargaining game. Each period a link is selected according to some probability distribution, and one of the two matched players is randomly chosen to make an offer to the other player specifying a division of the unit surplus between themselves. If the offer is accepted, the two players exit the game with the shares agreed on. If the offer is rejected, the two players remain in the game for the next period. In the next period the game is repeated on the subnetwork induced by the set of remaining players. We assume that all players have perfect information of all the events preceding any of their decision nodes in the game. All players have a common discount factor.
In this environment the following questions arise: How are the relative strengths of the firms affected by the pattern of compatibilities (that is, the network structure)? Which partnerships are possible in equilibrium and on what terms? Is an efficient allocation of the processes achievable in equilibrium? We address these issues in the context of Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs). Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Maskin and Tirole (2001) present arguments for the relevance of MPEs. The natural notion of a Markov state in the class of models we consider is the network induced by players who did not reach agreement, along with the selection of a link and a proposer.
We prove that an MPE always exists and demonstrate by example that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. Existence of MPEs is established via a fixed-point argument rather than by explicit construction. Finding one MPE for a given network structure is typically a complex exercise due to the simultaneous determination of the pairs of players reaching agreement in equilibrium (if matched to bargain in the first period of the game) and the evolution of the network structure as agreements are realized and play proceeds. We provide a method to construct pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors based on conjectures about the set of links across which agreement may obtain in every subnetwork.
We offer an example where no MPE of the bargaining game is efficient even asymptotically as players become patient. This leads naturally to the question of whether an asymptotically efficient (non-Markovian) subgame perfect equilibrium always exists. In a companion paper, Abreu and Manea (2009) , we answer the question affirmatively. Even though MPEs may be inefficient, Markov strategies are still essential to our construction of asymptotically efficient subgame perfect equilibria. The building block of the construction is an MPE of a modified game that differs from the original one primarily in "prohibiting" inefficient agreements. Manea (2011) assumes that players who reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. The bargaining protocol is identical to the one of the present paper. The two models differ in strategic complexity. In the model of Manea (2011) bargaining opportunities are stationary over time. A player's decisions consist solely in determining who his most favorable bargaining partners are. In effect, each player solves a search problem with prizes endogenously and simultaneously determined by the network structure.
In the present model a player's decisions additionally entail anticipating that passing up bargaining opportunities may lead to agreements involving other players which undermine or enhance his position in the network in future bargaining encounters. Technically, this means that we need to compute equilibrium payoffs for every subnetwork that may arise following a series of agreements.
Our modeling strategy has been to allow for full generality of the network structure while keeping other elements of the model relatively simple. Nevertheless, two aspects of the model deserve discussion. One is the assumption that the surplus any pair of players can generate is either zero or one. In fact it would not be difficult to work with a more general and less symmetric model. However, the assumption that all links have the same value is useful in analyzing particular examples and allows us to characterize relative bargaining strengths in terms of the network structure. Another restrictive assumption is that only one link is chosen for bargaining in every round. We provide justification for this assumption below.
Nevertheless, the assumption may also be relaxed. Our main results generalize to settings with varying gains from trade and multiple simultaneous matches.
There is an extensive literature on bargaining in markets starting with Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) . Important subsequent papers include Gale (1987) and Binmore and Herrero (1988) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) . The focus is on the relationship between the equilibrium outcomes of various decentralized bargaining procedures and the competitive equilibrium price as the costs of search and delay become negligible. The various stochastic matching processes considered in this literature treat all buyers and respectively all sellers anonymously. The analogue of this modeling assumption in our setting is the special case of buyer-seller networks in which every buyer is connected to every seller. For such networks, the payoffs in any MPE of our bargaining game converge to the competitive equilibrium outcome, as players become patient. However, in our analysis the network is arbitrary.
In particular, some pairs of buyers and sellers are not connected and cannot trade. Since bargaining encounters are restricted by network connections, the competitive equilibrium analysis does not apply.
Polanski (2007) studies a model similar to ours, but with a fundamentally different matching technology. He assumes that a maximum number of pairs of connected players are selected to bargain every period. In that setting Polanski obtains a payoff characterization which is neatly related to the classical Gallai-Edmonds decomposition. As a consequence of the maximum matching assumption, efficiency is not an issue in Polanski's model (in contrast to our work) and furthermore, in equilibrium, all matched pairs reach agreement immediately.
In our completely decentralized matching process a fundamental tension emerges between the global structure of efficient matchings in a network and the local nature of incentives for trade. Even in simple examples, asymptotically inefficient outcomes arise in equilibrium.
We also obtain richer dynamics for the evolution of network structure due to the fact that not all matches lead to trade in equilibrium. As mentioned earlier, the tools we develop can be extended to deal with settings where more than one link is chosen for bargaining in every round.
An alternative rationale for the one-match-per-period assumption is as follows. In terms of the essential analytics, what matters is that multiple agreements are not reached at the same instant. If we take the underlying temporal reality to be continuous--and consequently assume that matching takes place in continuous time-then the probability that several matches occur simultaneously is zero. In this view our assumption is indeed natural.
Polanski and Winter (2010) consider a model where buyers and sellers connected by a network are matched to bargain according to a protocol similar to ours. The critical difference is that players do not exit the game upon reaching agreements. Although every player can make several transactions over time, players are assumed to behave as if they derive utility only from their next transaction. Corominas-Bosch (2004) considers a model in which buyers and sellers alternate in making public offers that may be accepted by any of the responders connected to a specific proposer. As in Polanski (2007) , the matching process specifies that when there are multiple possibilities to match buyers and sellers (that is, there are multiple agents proposing or accepting identical prices) the maximum number of transactions takes place. Kranton and Minehart (2001) study trade in networks in a model based on centralized simultaneous auctions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the model and establish existence of MPEs. Section 3 provides examples of MPEs in some simple networks. Section 4 suggests an approach to computing MPEs. We show that the MPEs are not necessarily payoff equivalent and that asymptotically efficient MPEs do not always exist in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
Framework
Let N denote the set of n players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A network is an undirected graph H = (V, E) with set of vertices V ⊂ N and set of edges (also called links) E ⊂ {(i, j)|i = j ∈ V } such that (j, i) ∈ E whenever (i, j) ∈ E. We identify the links (i, j) and (j, i), and use the shorthand ij or ji instead. We say that player i is connected in H to player j if ij ∈ E. We often abuse notation and write i ∈ H for i ∈ V and ij ∈ H for ij ∈ E. A player is isolated in H if he has no links in H.
We write H V for the subnetwork of H induced by the vertices in V \ V . Every network H has an associated probability distribution over links (p ij (H)) ij∈H with p ij (H) > 0, ∀ij ∈ H which describes the matching process.
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Let G be a fixed network with vertex set N . A link ij in G is interpreted as the ability of players i and j to jointly generate a unit surplus.
2 Consider the following infinite horizon bargaining game generated by the network G. Let G 0 = G. Each period t = 0, 1, . . . a single link ij in G t is selected with probability p ij (G t ) and one of the players (the proposer) i and j is chosen randomly (with equal conditional probability) to make an offer to the other 1 Note the flexibility of the matching protocol. In one appealing specification, all links are equally likely to generate a match. In another special case, each player is drawn with equal probability and then one of his links is chosen uniformly at random. 2 We do not exclude networks in which some players are isolated.
player (the responder) specifying a division of the unit surplus between themselves. If the responder accepts the offer, the two players exit the game with the shares agreed on. If the responder rejects the offer, the two players remain in the game for the next period. In period t + 1 the game is repeated with the set of players from period t, except for i and j in case period t ends in agreement, on the subnetwork G t+1 induced by this set of players in G.
Hence G t+1 = G t {i, j} if players i and j reach an agreement in period t, and G t+1 = G t otherwise. We assume that all players have perfect information of all the events preceding any of their decision nodes in the game. 3 All players share a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The bargaining game is denoted Γ δ (G).
There are three types of histories. We denote by h t a history of the game up to (not including) time t, which is a sequence of t − 1 pairs of proposers and responders connected in G, with corresponding proposals and responses. We call such histories, and the subgames that follow them, complete. A complete history h t uniquely determines the set of players N (h t ) participating in the game at the beginning of period t; denote by G(h t ) the subnetwork of G induced by N (h t ). Let G be the set of subnetworks of G induced by the players remaining in any subgame, G = ∪ ht G(h t ), and define G 0 = G \{G}. We denote by (h t ; i → j) the history consisting of h t followed by nature selecting i to propose to j. We denote by (h t ; i → j; x) the history consisting of (h t ; i → j) followed by i offering x ∈ [0, 1] to j.
A strategy σ i for player i specifies, for all complete histories h t and all players j such that ij ∈ G(h t ), the offer σ i (h t ; i → j) that i makes to j after the history (h t ; i → j), and the response σ i (h t ; j → i; x) that i gives to j after the history (h t ; j → i; x). We allow for mixed strategies, hence σ i (h t ; i → j) and σ i (h t ; j → i; x) are probability distributions over [0, 1] and {Yes, No}, respectively. A strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈N is a subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ δ (G) if it induces Nash equilibria in subgames following every history (h t ; i → j) and (h t ; i → j; x).
The equilibrium analysis is simplified if we restrict attention to Markov strategies. The state at a certain stage is given by the subnetwork of players who did not reach agreement by that stage, along with the selection of a link and a proposer. Then the only feature of a complete history of past bargaining encounters that is relevant for future behavior is the network induced by the remaining players following that history. That is, for all complete histories h t and all links ij ∈ G(h t ), the offer σ i (h t ; i → j) that i makes to j depends only on G(h t ), i, j, and i's response σ i (h t ; j → i; x) to the offer x from j depends only on G(h t ), i, j, x. 4 A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) is a subgame perfect equilibrium in Markov strategies. 5 We first establish existence of MPEs. 
according to σ * δ (G), every player k has expected payoffs v * δ k (G) at the beginning of any subgame before which no agreement has occurred, and v * δ k (G {i, j}) at the beginning of any subgame before which only i and j reached an agreement (k = i, j).
Fix a history (h t ; i → j) along which no agreement has been reached (G(h t ) = G). In the subgame following (h t ; i → j), it must be that the strategy σ * δ j (G) specifies that player j accept any offer larger than δv * δ j (G), and reject any offer smaller than δv * δ j (G). Then it is not optimal for i to make an offer x > δv * δ j (G) to j, since i would be better off making some offer in the interval (δv * δ j (G), x) instead, as j accepts such offers with probability 1. Hence, in equilibrium i has to offer j at most δv * δ j (G) with probability 1, and j may accept with positive probability only offers of δv * δ j (G). Let q be the probability (conditional on 4 Formally, a Markov strategy profile σ satisfies the following conditions
for all h t , h t with G(h t ) = G(h t ), for every ij ∈ G(h t ) and x ∈ [0, 1].
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In other accounts ( [11] , [12] ), the concepts defined here would be referred to as stationary Markov strategies and stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. 6 More precisely, subgame consistency of (σ(H)) H∈H requires that σ(H)(h t ; i → j) = σ(H )(h t ; i → j) and σ(H)(h t ; i → j; x) = σ(H )(h t ; i → j; x) for all pairs of players (i, j), all offers x, all h t and h t such that the players remaining in the subgame h t of Γ δ (H) and the subgame h t of Γ δ (H ) induce identical networks (which include the link ij), and all H, H ∈ H.
(h t ; i → j)) of the joint event that i offers δv * δ j (G) to j and the offer is accepted. The payoff of any player k = i, j at the beginning of the next period is v * δ k (G {i, j}) in case i and j reach an agreement, and v * δ k (G) otherwise. Therefore, the time t expected payoff of k conditional on the history (h t ; i → j) is qδv * δ
, when i is chosen to propose to j, it must be that in equilibrium i offers δv * δ j (G) and agreement obtains with probability 1, i.e., q = 1. For, if q < 1 then i's expected payoff conditional on offering δv * δ
we argued that j accepts offers greater than δv * δ j (G) with probability 1). But for small ε > 0, q(1 − δv * δ
Hence it is not optimal for i to offer δv * δ j (G) to j. By the same token, offers smaller than δv * δ j (G) are not optimal for i since they are rejected with probability 1 and yield expected payoff δv * δ
We already argued that no offer greater than δv * δ j (G) may be optimal for i either. Therefore, if δ(v * δ i (G) + v * δ j (G)) < 1 and q < 1, then i cannot have a best response to j's equilibrium strategy. We established
where (δv * δ (G {i, j})
coordinate equal to δv * δ k (G {i, j}), i coordinate equal to 1 − δv j , and j coordinate equal to δv j . Note that f i→j k (v * δ (G)) is the set of possible time t expected payoffs for player k conditional on the history (h t ; i → j), where the behaviors of i and j are constrained by the equilibrium analysis above.
Let h t be a history along which no agreement has occurred, and consider the resulting period t subgame. Since nature selects player i to make an offer to player j with probability p ij (G)/2 for each link ij ∈ G, and conditional on the selection, f i→j (v * δ (G)) describes the time t expected payoffs constrained by the equilibrium requirements, f (v * δ (G)) is the set of expected payoffs at the beginning of the subgame h t consistent with our partial equilibrium analysis when players behave according to σ * δ (G). In equilibrium, the time t expected payoff vector conditional on the history
is a fixed point of f . Conversely, we show in the Appendix that any fixed point of f is an MPE payoff vector. In the Appendix, we use a bootstrap approach to construct an MPE for any
based on a subgame consistent family of MPEs (σ * δ (G {i, j})) ij∈G for the bargaining games (Γ δ (G {i, j})) ij∈G . We establish that the correspondence f derived from the payoffs of the latter family of MPEs has a fixed point, which by Lemma 1 translates into an MPE of Γ δ (G).
The proof proceeds by induction on the number of vertices inG.
Remark 1.
It is straightforward to extend the proof of Proposition 1 to a setting with heterogeneous link values.
Remark 2. We can also generalize the existence result to the case in which multiple pairs of players are matched to bargain simultaneously. In the general specification of the matching protocol, a collection of pairwise disjoint proposer-responder pairs is drawn at each date from a probability distribution which depends only on the underlying network at that date. We assume that a public randomization device is available in this setting. The additional steps necessary for the proof are outlined in the Appendix. 7 Recall that G 0 denotes the set of subnetworks of G, different from G, induced by the players remaining in any subgame of Γ δ (G).
Examples of MPEs
In this section we provide examples of MPEs for some simple networks. We assume throughout that all links are equally likely to be selected for bargaining in the initial network and in any subnetwork that may arise in subgames. That is, the probability distribution p(H) is uniform across the links in H for all networks H. We mainly focus on equilibrium payoffs. Strategies may be constructed as in the proof of Lemma 1.
Consider first a star network, where one player controls the bargaining opportunities of all other players. Formally, in the star of n network G star n player 1 is connected to each of the players k = 2, . . . , n. Proposition 4(i) in Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) shows that the bargaining game Γ δ (G star n ) has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (which turns out to be Markovian). In the equilibrium, agreement is obtained in the first match. It is easy to see that the payoffs satisfy the equations
The solution is
As δ → 1, the equilibrium payoffs converge to 1/2 for both players if n = 2, and to 1 for player 1 and 0 for all other players when n ≥ 3. (1, 2) and (3, 4) reach agreements with probability 1 when matched to bargain in the first period.
For low δ there is a unique MPE of Γ δ (G line 4 ). In any subgame, every match ends in agreement. By the proof of Proposition 1 and by symmetry, the equilibrium payoffs solve the following system,
The unique solution is given by
There is an MPE with payoffs as above only if the solution satisfies δ(v * δ
The latter inequality is equivalent to δ ≤ δ ≈ .945, where δ is the unique root in the
For high δ, there is no MPE of Γ δ (G line 4 ) in which players 2 and 3 agree with probability 1 when matched to bargain with each other. In such an equilibrium players 1 and 4 would be weak (receiving zero payoffs in subgames following agreements between 2 and 3), making the patient players 2 and 3 powerful to an extent that prevents them from reaching an agreement with each other. Also, there exists no MPE in which players 2 and 3 disagree with probability 1 when matched to bargain. In such an equilibrium all players would receive payoffs smaller than 1/2, and players 2 and 3 would have incentives to trade.
For δ > δ, there exists an MPE of Γ δ (G line 4 ) in which players 2 and 3 reach agreement with some probability q * δ ∈ (0, 1) conditional on their link being selected for bargaining. The probabilities that 2 accepts an offer from 3 and that 3 accepts an offer from 2 are not pinned down by the MPE requirements. Only the average q * δ of the two conditional probabilities is relevant for MPE payoff computation. There exist multiple MPEs, all payoff equivalent, as explained in footnote 23.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we need the equilibrium payoffs of players 2 and 3 to satisfy
By symmetry, the equilibrium payoffs solve the following system,
.
Note that, as players become patient, the conditional probability of agreement between players 2 and 3 converges to 0 and the MPE payoffs converge to 1/2 for each player. The intuition is that players 2 and 3 could obtain payoffs greater than 1/2 in the limit only by extorting players 1 and 4 via the threat of an agreement across the link (2, 3), which would leave 1 and 4 disconnected. Yet, players 2 and 3 cannot reach an agreement if their limit equilibrium payoffs are larger than 1/2.
Similarly, there exists an MPE of the bargaining game on the line of 6 network, Γ δ (G line 6 ), in which as δ goes to 1, the common probability of first period agreement across the links (2, 3) and (4, 5) vanishes, while agreement obtains with probability 1 across all other links.
All players receive expected payoffs of 1/2 in the limit.
For the line of 5, 7, 8, 9, . . . networks, and other more complex ones, computing MPE payoffs for the bargaining game for every δ may be a difficult task. For such networks, the next section investigates limit MPE payoffs and agreement probabilities as players become patient. For various network structures, we can use a bootstrap approach to directly compute limit MPE payoffs and agreement probabilities as players become patient. We then construct MPEs of Γ δ (G) for high δ that generate the determined limit payoffs and agreements as δ → 1. As in Proposition 1, we use known limit MPE payoffs in subgames Γ δ (G) forG ∈ G 0 in order to characterize equilibrium behavior in Γ δ (G). Suppose that for every δ ∈ (0, 1) we specified a subgame consistent family of MPEs for the bargaining games (Γ δ (G {i, j})) ij∈G
Limit Properties of MPEs
Fix a profile of initial agreement probabilities (q δ ij ) ij∈G for every discount factor δ. We set out to construct an MPE for Γ δ (G) that generates the first period agreement probabilities q δ and leads to the payoffs v * δ (G {i, j}) in subgames that induce the subnetwork G {i, j}.
By the proof of Proposition 1, the MPE payoffs solve the n × n linear system of equations,
Contrary to appearances, the equations above do not assume that the probability of an agreement between i and k is split evenly between the events that i or k plays the role of the proposer. The split is not unique only if q δ ik ∈ (0, 1), in which case the MPE payoffs should satisfy 1 − δv i = δv k . Then the exact allocation of the total probability of agreement p ik q δ ik between the terms 1 − δv i and δv k does not affect the expression on the right hand side. See also footnote 23.
Assume that for all ij ∈ G, q δ ij and v * δ (G {i, j}) converge to q ij and v * (G {i, j}), respectively, as δ goes to 1. Consider the linear system obtained by taking the limit δ → 1 10 To simplify notation, we write p ij for p ij (G).
The next result describes the relationship between the solutions of the two linear systems and provides sufficient conditions under which solutions to the latter system constitute limit MPE payoffs.
For parts (2)- (4), assume additionally that q ij > 0 for at least two links ij ∈ G.
Then the following statements hold.
(1) The system 4.1 has a unique solution, denoted v δ,q δ .
(2) The system 4.2 also has a unique solution, denoted v q . dashed, or thick line segment depending on whether the probability of first period agreement across that link in MPEs for high δ is 0, a number in (0, 1) (then the limit probability as δ → 1 is mentioned next to the link), 12 or 1, respectively. 
Multiple MPE Payoffs
Multiple MPE payoffs may exist for the bargaining game on some networks for high discount factors. One example is the bargaining game Γ δ (G sq+line 3 ), on the network G sq+line 3 depicted in Figure 2 .
Proposition 3. There exists δ < 1 such that for every δ ∈ (δ, 1) the game Γ δ (G sq+line 3 ) has (at least) three MPEs that are pairwise payoff unequivalent. 13 In Section 3 we discussed networks in which the MPE probabilities of agreement for high δ are different from 0 and 1, but converge to 0 or 1 as δ → 1. Section 5 details an example in which for some links even the limit MPE agreement probabilities belong to (0, 1). If players 5 and 6 reach the first agreement, then players 1, 2, 3, 4 induce a subgame equivalent to the bargaining game on the square network, G sq , and player 7 is left disconnected.
If players 6 and 7 reach the initial agreement, then players 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 induce a subgame equivalent to the bargaining game on the square plus point network, G sq+point .
The limit MPE payoffs and initial agreements for G sq , G sq+point , and a network isomorphic to the line of 5 are summarized in Figure 3 . The limit linear system 4.2 for Γ δ (G sq+line 3 )
with the conjectured profile of initial agreement probabilities is as follows, In each equation the terms correspond in order to the selection for bargaining of the links (k, k + 1) for k = 1, 2, . . . , 6, followed by the link (1, 4) . The unique solution is given by Note that players 1 and 3 hold symmetric positions in G sq+line 3 , but they play asymmetric roles in the MPE constructed above. We can obtain another MPE for high δ by simply interchanging the roles of players 1 and 3 in the postulated agreement structure. The payoffs of players 1 and 3 differ between the two pure strategy MPEs for high δ.
For sufficiently high δ, Γ δ (G sq+line 3 ) has a third MPE, in which there is a common probability in the interval (0, 1) of first period agreement across the links (1, 4) and (3, 4). 16 The limit MPE agreement probabilities are q 14 = q 34 ≈ 17 0.528758 and q ij = 1 for all other links ij. The limit MPE payoffs are
Therefore, for high δ the bargaining game Γ δ (G sq+line 3 ) has at least three MPEs. Note that the mixed strategy MPE is not payoff equivalent with either of the pure strategy MPEs for any player.
Inefficient MPEs
Let µ(G) denote the maximum total surplus that can be generated in the network G. That is, µ(G) is the cardinality of the largest collection of pairwise disjoint links in G. 18 To generate the maximum total surplus µ(G) in Γ δ (G) as δ → 1, pairs of players connected by links that are inefficient in the induced subnetworks in various subgames need to refrain from reaching agreements. However, providing incentives against agreements that are collectively inefficient is difficult. Some players may be concerned that passing up bargaining opportunities can lead to agreements involving their potential bargaining partners which undermine their position in the network in future bargaining encounters. Indeed, one can find networks for which all
MPEs of the bargaining game are asymptotically inefficient as players become patient. 16 The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2. 17 The value of the limit probability is one of the four roots of an irreducible polynomial of degree 4. 18 This and related terms are defined formally in Abreu and Manea (2009) . Consider the network G tr+point illustrated in Figure 4 , with a uniform probability distribution governing the selection of links for bargaining. Assume that δ is close to 1 so that the welfare cost of delay between consecutive matches is negligible. The maximum total surplus in this network is 2 and it can be achieved in the limit as δ → 1 only if both pairs (1, 2) and (3, 4) reach agreement. It is clearly inefficient for player 2 to trade with either player 3 or 4 because this would leave the remaining players isolated and create only one unit of surplus. Proposition 4 below establishes that for any δ ∈ (0, 1), Γ δ (G tr+point ) has a unique MPE. In the MPE every pair reaches agreement when matched to bargain. Since (2, 3) or (2, 4) are matched first with probability 1/2, the expected total surplus generated by the MPE approaches 1/2 × 1 + 1/2 × 2 = 3/2 < 2 = µ(G tr+point ) as δ → 1.
Note that using Proposition 2, we can immediately evaluate the limit MPE payoffs to be 11/56 ≈ .196 for player 1, 5/8 = .625 for player 2, and 19/56 ≈ .339 for players 3 and 4. One interesting feature of this example is that G tr+point is not unilaterally stable with respect to the limit MPE payoffs. 19 Indeed, if player 4 severed his link with player 2, the line of 4 network would ensue, and player 4's limit MPE payoff would increase from 19/56 to 1/2.
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Thus player 4 would be better off if he could credibly commit to never trade with player 2.
Proposition 4. For every δ ∈ (0, 1), the game Γ δ (G tr+point ) has a unique MPE. In the MPE agreement occurs with probability 1 across every link selected for bargaining in the first period.
19 See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Manea (2011) for definitions of stability. 20 In general, to apply the concept of stability consistently we would need to use an equilibrium selection criterion for networks with multiple (payoff non-equivalent) MPEs (as in Section 5). However, this issue is inconsequential for the current argument, since both Γ δ (G line 4 ) and Γ δ (G tr+point ) have unique MPE payoffs for every δ.
Proof. We show that for every δ ∈ (0, 1), all MPEs of Γ δ (G tr+point ) involve agreement with (conditional) probability 1 for every pair of players matched to bargain in the first period.
Fix a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and an MPE σ of Γ δ (G tr+point ). Denote by v i the expected payoff of player i under σ.
We first argue that agreement occurs under σ with probability 1 in the first period if the link (1, 2) or (3, 4) is selected for bargaining. We only treat the case of the former link, as the latter is similar. The strategy profile σ determines a distribution over joint outcomes for players 1 and 2, where an outcome for a given player specifies the time of an agreement involving that player and the share he receives. For every realization of agreements under σ, the sum of the corresponding discounted payoffs for players 1 and 2 is not greater than 1.
Indeed,
• when 2 reaches an agreement with 1, the sum of the undiscounted payoffs of the two players is 1
• when 2 reaches an agreement with 3 or 4, player 2's undiscounted payoff cannot exceed 1 and player 1's is 0 (an agreement between 2 and 3 or 4 isolates 1)
• thus the expected discounted payoffs of 1 and 2 satisfy v 1 + v 2 ≤ 1.
Therefore, δ(v 1 + v 2 ) < 1, and hence players 1 and 2 reach an agreement under σ if matched to bargain in the first period of the game.
Let p and q denote the probabilities of first period agreement across the links (2, 3) and (2, 4) , respectively (conditional on the respective link being selected for bargaining). We next show by contradiction that p = q. Without loss of generality, assume that p > q. It must be that p > 0, q < 1.
It can be easily seen that the payoffs satisfy
In each of the two sums, the first term represents the continuation payoffs of 1/2 received by players 3 and 4 conditional on the link (1, 2) being selected for bargaining in the first period.
The second term corresponds to an agreement between players 3 and 4 when matched to bargain. Here we use the fact that the selection of the links (1, 2) and (3, 4) leads to trade under σ. The term (1 − δv 2 + δv 3 )/2 appears in the evaluation of the payoff of player 3 because under σ,
• if δ(v 2 + v 3 ) < 1, then player 3 offers δv 2 when selected to make an offer to 2 and player 2 accepts with conditional probability 1
• if δ(v 2 + v 3 ) = 1, then player 3 obtains a continuation payoff of 1 − δv 2 = δv 3 when selected to make an offer to 2 regardless of whether the offer is accepted or rejected.
Similarly, the third term in the expression for v 4 can be explained by the inequality δ(v 2 + v 4 ) ≥ 1. The last terms in the two equations reflect the probabilities of agreements that player 2 reaches with 4 (3), leaving player 3 (4) isolated.
Putting together 6.2 and 6.3, we obtain that
This leads to a contradiction, as
We have established that p = q. It is easy to check that if p = q = 0 then v 1 = v 2 = v 3 = v 4 < 1/2, and hence δ(v 2 + v 3 ) < 1, contradicting p = 0. Therefore, p = q > 0. Assume, by contradiction, that p = q < 1. Using arguments similar to those above, it can be argued that the payoffs solve
For every p ∈ [0, 1], the unique solution of the system of linear equations above is given by
,
Therefore, the equilibrium payoffs satisfy δ(v 2 + v 3 ) < 1, which contradicts p < 1. We thus
It can be immediately verified that the strategies in which player i offers δv j (1) when chosen to make an offer to j and player j accepts offers greater than or equal to δv j (1) and rejects smaller offers define an MPE. The arguments above establish that this constitutes the unique MPE. Many open questions remain, including the analysis of network structures which lead to multiplicity or inefficiency of MPEs. It is unclear at this stage whether useful characterizations are attainable. Another interesting direction is to endogenize the matching process.
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The latter undertaking entails qualitative changes in the model structure. These are intriguing topics for future research.
The strategy profile σ * δ (G) defined below constitutes an MPE with payoffs v. We first define the strategies for histories h t along which at least one agreement occurred. Recall that G(h t ) denotes the network induced by the players remaining in the subgame h t . Construct the time t strategy of each player according to the date 0 behavior specified by σ * δ (G(h t )).
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For histories along which no agreement has occurred, σ * δ (G) specifies that when i is chosen to propose to j he offers min(1 − δv i , δv j ), and when i has to respond to an offer from j he accepts with probability 1 any offer greater than δv i , accepts with probability q j→i an offer of δv i , and rejects with probability 1 any smaller offers.
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The subgame consistency of the collection (σ * δ (G))G ∈G 0 guarantees that under the constructed σ * δ (G) the expected payoffs in any subgame of Γ δ (G) with induced networkG ∈ G 0 are v * δ (G), and that σ * δ (G) is an MPE with expected payoffs v.
Continuation of the Proof of Proposition 1. We use Lemma 1 to show the existence of MPEs.
We prove more generally that there exists a subgame consistent collection of MPEs for the
, where G(n ) denotes the subset of subnetworks in G that have at most n vertices. We proceed by induction on n . For n = 0, 1, the statement is trivially satisfied since the corresponding games are eventless.
Suppose we established the statement for all lower values, and we proceed to proving it for n (2 ≤ n ≤ n). By the induction hypothesis, there exists a subgame consistent collection of
with n vertices, and let G 0 be the set of all subnetworks of G , excluding G , induced in all subgames of Γ δ (G ). Then G 0 is a subset of G(n − 1). Therefore, the collection of MPEs (σ * δ (G))G ∈G 0 for the games (Γ δ (G)) G∈G 0 is subgame consistent, and we can use their payoffs to define f i→j and f as in 2.1-2.2 for the game Γ δ (G ).
n is an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with non-empty convex images. The correspondence f :
)(h 0 ; j → i; x) for all ij ∈ G(h t ) and x ∈ [0, 1], where h 0 denotes an empty history. 23 Payoff irrelevant MPE multiplicity may arise for two reasons. First, if δ(v i + v j ) > 1, when i is selected to propose to j, in the construction above i offers min(1 − δv i , δv j ) = 1 − δv i to j and the offer is rejected. The strategies may be modified so that i offers j any (mixed) offer x < δv j , as rejection obtains regardless (if we specify that j reject offers of δv j with probability 1 the constraint becomes x ≤ δv j ). Second, when δ(v i + v j ) = 1, we stipulated that i's offer to j is accepted with probability q i→j , and j's offer to i is accepted with probability q j→i . If q i→j + q j→i = 0, 2 then the equilibrium construction may be modified so that the two agreement probabilities become q i→j + ε and q j→i − ε, respectively, for a range of values of ε.
of the correspondences (f i→j ) {i→j|ij∈G } , hence it is upper hemi-continuous with non-empty convex images as well. By Kakutani's fixed point theorem, f has a fixed point.
We can use the steps from Lemma 1 to construct an MPE σ * δ (G ) of Γ δ (G ) so that the collection of MPEs (σ * δ (G))G ∈G(n −1)∪{G } is subgame consistent. If we append the MPEs σ * δ (G ) for all subnetworks G ∈ G with n vertices to the subgame consistent collection of MPEs (σ * δ (G))G ∈G(n −1) , the resulting collection of MPEs (σ * δ (G))G ∈G(n ) for the respective games (Γ δ (G))G ∈G(n ) is subgame consistent. This completes the proof of the induction step.
Proof of Remark 2. We assume the existence of a public randomization device. As in the proof of Proposition 1, consider a subgame consistent collection of MPEs (σ * δ (G))G ∈G of the respective games (Γ δ (G))G ∈G with corresponding payoffs (v * δ (G))G ∈G . Fix a history of length t along which no agreement has been reached and a realization of the randomization device at date t. Suppose that the pairs (i 1 , j 1 ), (i 2 , j 2 ), . . . , (i m , j m ) are matched to bargain at time t, with i l in the role of the proposer for l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} =: M .
Let q l denote the conditional probability of agreement between i l and j l at date t under σ * δ (G) (l ∈ M ). For l / ∈ A ⊂ M , let P l (A) be the probability that the pairs (i h , j h ) h∈A reach agreement, while (i h , j h ) h∈M \({l}∪A) do not, at time t,
(1 − q h ).
Player j l 's (discounted) expected continuation payoff conditional on rejecting i l 's offer at time t is A⊂M \{l} P l (A)δv * δ j l (G ∪ h∈A {i h , j h }).
Player i l 's continuation payoff conditional on his offer being rejected is obtained by simply replacing the subscript j l with i l in the expression above. Thus player i l prefers to make an acceptable (unacceptable) offer to j l if
is greater (smaller) than
combination of Nash equilibria of the corresponding auxiliary game. In that case, play is coordinated on each of the latter equilibria using the randomization device to match their weights in the convex combination. Then the equilibrium construction proceeds inductively as in the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first show that the system 4.1 has a unique solution v δ,q δ . The solutions to 4.1 are fixed points of the function h : R n → R n defined by It can be easily checked that h is a contraction with respect to the sup norm on R n , mapping
[0, 1] n into itself, hence it has a unique fixed point, denoted v δ,q δ , which belongs to [0, 1] n .
Therefore, for all δ ∈ (0, 1), v δ,q δ is the unique solution to 4.1. In particular, the linear system 4.1 is non-singular.
A more involved contraction argument establishes that the linear system 4.2 is non-singular when q ij > 0 for at least two links ij ∈ G. Redefine the function h : R n → R n by
If q ij > 0 for at least two links ij ∈ G, then one can prove that h • h is a contraction with respect to the sup norm on R n that maps We next extablish that lim δ→1 v δ,q δ l = v q l for all l ∈ N . Consider the linear system 4.1. All entries in the coefficient matrix and the augmented matrix are polynomial functions of 25 Note that h • h is a linear function. The hypothesis that q ij > 0 for at least two links ij ∈ G guarantees that the absolute values of the coefficients of v's components in h k (h(v)) sum to less than 1 for every k. 
